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1. Introduction:  Secure message transmission over an insecure channel, require both 
confidentiality and authenticity, which may be achieved through „signature then encryption‟ 
approach. However, in 1997 Zheng [24] proposed a cryptographic primitive “Signcryption” 
which achieves both confidentiality and authenticity in a single logical step with much lower 
computational cost than signature then encryption approach. Beak et al. [3] gave formal 
security model for signcryption scheme and provided security proof for Zheng‟s scheme in 
random oracle model. 
1984, Shamir [20] introduced the concept of identity based cryptography and gave the 
first identity based signature scheme. The idea of identity based cryptography is to enable a 
user to use any arbitrary string that uniquely identifies him as his public key. Identity based 
cryptography serves as an efficient alternative to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based 
system. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [5] gave the first identity based encryption scheme and 
in 2003 Malone-Lee [14] gave the first identity based signcryption scheme. He also 
considered security notions of signcryption in identity based setting. Since then many 
signcryption schemes have been proposed [1, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16]. 
In 1989, Boyed [6] defined multi signature scheme the scenario where more than one 
user authenticate a single message in such a way that a verifier verify only a single compact 
signature on that message. An identity based version of multi-signature was given by Gentry 
et al. [11] in 2006. Mitomi et al. [15] include confidentiality in multi-signature by 
signcrypting the message. Zhang et al. [22] gave an identity based multi-signcryption 
scheme. However, S. Deva et al. [18] find some flaw and fix them. Recently Zhang et al. [23] 
came up with a new multi-signcryption scheme in identity based setting which to the best our 
knowledge is most efficient scheme till date.  
The concept of multi-receiver setting was first given by Bellare et al. [4] for public 
key encryption where, there are n receivers numbered by 1,…,n and each of them generates 
for itself a private key and public key pair denoted by (ski , pki). A sender encrypts a message 
m using pki to obtain Ci for i = 1,…,n and then sends (C1,…,Cn) as a ciphertext. Upon 
receiving the ciphertext, receiver i extract Ci and decrypt it using ski. Beak et al. [2] 
formalized identity based encryption to the multiple receivers setting. Duan and Cao [10] 
consider the situation where there is not only multiple receiver but also multiple senders. As 
an example, consider that there are several managers, each of whom wants to securely 
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broadcast an e-mail to the employees of the company independently. Once an employee 
receives several ciphertexts from different managers, an issue of message authentication will 
arise. In such case confidentiality and authenticity required simultaneously. Motivated by this 
Duan and Cao [10] gave the first multi-receiver identity based signcryption scheme. Later on 
some more multi-receiver identity based signcryption schemes were proposed [12, 17, 19, 
21]. 
In this paper, we propose an identity based multi- signcryption scheme which is more 
efficient then the schemes S. Deva et. al [18] and Zhang et. al [23]. Our scheme needs no 
pairing computation on the signcryption stage. The scheme also possesses public verifiability 
for signature. We also convert our proposed scheme for multiple receivers, which we believe 
is the first multi-signcryption scheme for multiple receivers.  
2. Preliminaries: 
 Let 1  be an additive group and 2  be a multiplicative group, of the same prime 
order q . A function 1 1 2e :    is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following 
properties: 
   (i) * ab1 qP,Q , a,b ,e(aP,bQ) e(P,Q)     
   (ii) For any point 1P ,e(P,Q) 1  for all 1Q   if only if P  , the identity of 1  
   (iii) There exists an efficient algorithm to compute 1e(P,Q) P,Q  .  
Given 1(P,aP,bP)   for unknown 
*a,b  , the Computational Diffie-Hellman 
Problem (CDH Problem) in 1 is to compute abP . 
Given two groups 1  and 2  of the same prime order q , a bilinear map 
1 1 2e :   , a generator P of 1 , three elements aP,bP,cP  of 1  and an element 
2H  , the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH Problem) is to decide 
whether abcH e(P,P) . 
Before giving the proposed multi-signcryption scheme, first we formalize Identity 
based Multi-Signcryption 
     An Identity based Multi- Signcryption scheme consists of the following algorithms: 
 Setup: Given a security parameter k, the Private Key Generator (PKG) chooses a 
secret value randomly and generates master secret key msk and the public parameters 
params of the system. 
 Key Extract: Given a user identity *ID {0,1} , the PKG computes the corresponding 
private key S  and transmits it to the user in a secure way. 
 Signcrypt: Different users with identities 1 nL {ID ,..., ID }  run this algorithm to 
signcrypt a message m  to the receiver‟s identity BID  to obtain signcryption . 
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 Unsigncrypt: The receiver B  with identity BID  and private key BS  runs this 
algorithm to obtain plaintext m , if  is a valid signcryption from L to identity BID  
otherwise return . 
      For consistency, we require that if  
1 n 1 n Bsigncrypt( , L {ID , ..., ID }, S , ..., S , ID ),m then 
1 n B Bunsigncrypt( , L {ID ,..., ID }, ID , S )m . 
3. The proposed scheme: 
Setup:  Given k is the security parameter, the PKG chooses the system parameter that 
includes two groups 1 2,   of same prime order q , a bilinear map 1 1 2e :   , a 
generator 1P  , randomly chosen R qs  , R 1R (R P, )   and computes 
pub 1P sP   and pube(P ,R) . The PKG also chooses cryptographic hash functions 
*
0 1H :{0,1}  , 1 2H : {0,1}
l , *2 1 1 qH :{0,1}
l      where l  is the length of 
plaintext and ciphertext . 
The system public parameters are 
                            1 2 pub 0 1 2params q, , , e, , P, P , , R, H , H , Hl    
Key Extract:  Given a user identity *ID {0,1} , PKG compute public key ID 0Q H (ID) and 
private key ID IDS sQ  . 
Signcrypt:  Given a message {0,1}lm , a receiver‟s identity BID  and n senders‟ identities 
1 nL {ID ,..., ID } , each user iID  executes the following steps 
 (i)  Randomly chooses *i qx   and computes i iX x P , 
xi
iY and i i BU x (R Q ) . 
(ii)  Sends i i i(X ,Y , U )  to other signers through a secure channel. 
(iii) After receiving from the other signers j j j(X ,Y ,U ) , user iID  computes 
(a) 
n
i
i 1
X X ,
n
i
i 1
Y Y ,
n
i
i 1
Q Q and
n
i
i 1
U U . 
(b) 1c H (Y) m . 
(c) 2h H (c, X, U) . 
(d) i i iZ hS x Q  
 (iv) Each user sends iZ to other users. Every user computes Z and outputs ciphertext , 
where  
n
i
i 1
Z Z and c, X, Z, U, L .   
 
Unsigncrypt: To unsigncrypt the ciphertext c, X, Z, U, L , the receiver with identity 
BID  computes  
(i)  2h H (c, X, U) , and accepts iff 
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(ii) pube(P,Z) e(X hP ,Q) . 
      It then computes 
(iii) 1pub BY' e(P ,U)e(X,S ) , and recovers 
(iv) 1c H (Y ')m  
4. Security : 
(i) Confidentiality: Without knowing the secrete key of receiver, no one can compute   
n
i
i 1
Y Y
(x ... x )1 n (x ... x )1 n
pube(P ,R) . It is only the specific receiver who can compute 
the actual value of Y using secrete key as 
   1pub BY' e(P ,U)e(X,S ) = 
n
1
pub i B
i 1
e(P , U )e(X,S )  
            
n
1
pub i B B
i 1
e(P , x (R Q ))e(X,S )  
             
n n
1
pub i pub i B B
i 1 i 1
e(P , x R)e(P x Q )e(X,S )  
              1pub 1 n 1 n B Be(P ,(x ... x )R)e(sP,(x ... x )Q )e(X,S )  
             (x ... x ) 11 npub 1 n B Be(P ,R) e((x ... x )P, sQ )e(X,S )  
              
(x ... x ) 11 n
B Be(X,S )e(X,S )  
                 
(x ... x )1 n     Y . 
 
(ii) Public Verifiability: Any one who has access to the signcryptext can verify the signature 
on the ciphertext which it contains. First the verifier computes 2h H (c, X, U) and 
n
i
i 1
Q Q , 
then checks                 
      
n
i i
i 1
e(P, Z) e(P, (hS x Q))
n n
i i
i 1 i 1
e(P, hS )e(P, x Q)  
                  
n n
i i
i 1 i 1
e(P, hsQ )e(P, x Q)  
                  
n
i 1 n
i 1
e(P,hs Q )e(P,(x ... x )Q)  
                  1 ne(P,hsQ)e((x ... x )P,Q)  
                  e(hsP,Q)e(X,Q)  
                  pube(hP ,Q)e(X,Q)  
                  pube(X hP ,Q) . 
(iii) Unforgeability: Signcryptext is generated using the secret key iS of each of the signers. 
Thus no one, not even the one among signers can generate a valid signcryptext without 
knowing the secret key of all the signers. 
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5. Efficiency Comparison: We compare efficiency of our scheme with existing schemes [18, 
23]. We consider the costly operations which include scalar multiplications in 1  ( 1 Mul), 
exponentiations in 2  ( 2 Exp) and pairing operations (Pairing) as shown below 
 
 Signcrypt Unsigncrypt 
1 Mul 2 Exp Pairing 1 Mul 2 Exp Pairing 
S. Deva et al. [18] 3n n n 0 1 4 
Zhang et al. [23] 4n 0 n 0 1 4 
Proposed Scheme 4n n 0 1 0 4 
Table - 1 
6. Remarks: 
(i) In the proposed schemes, we use the concept of Duan and Cao [10] which they proposed 
to construct an Identity based Multi-receiver signcryption scheme. 
(ii) One of the important advantages of the proposed scheme is that no pairing computation is 
needed for signcryption. This makes the scheme quite efficient. 
(iii) To achieve efficiency in Zhang et al. scheme [23], only one signer will compute the 
signcryptext but in our scheme every user can generates own copy of signcryptext. 
(iv) The proposed scheme is publicly verifiable. Any one who can access to the signcryptext 
can verify the signature on ciphertext c . Thus the proposed scheme is more applicable when 
signing a joint confidential contract between two or more organizations. Any one can verify 
the authenticity of the contract without getting any knowledge of it, however, only the 
authority can read the contract.   
7. Identity Based Multi-Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Receiver: 
An Identity based Multi- Signcryption scheme for Multi-Receivers consists of the following 
algorithms: 
 Setup: Given a security parameter k, the Private Key Generator (PKG) chooses a 
secret value randomly and generates master secret key msk and the public parameters 
params of the system. 
 Key Extract: Given a user identity *ID {0,1} , the PKG computes the corresponding 
private key S  and transmits it to the user in a secure way. 
 Signcrypt: Any n users 1 nL {ID ,..., ID }  run this algorithm to signcrypt a message 
m  to any 'n  receiver‟s with identities * 1 n 'L {ID' ,..., ID ' } , and to obtain 
signcryption . 
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 Unsigncrypt: Each receiver with identity jID' and private key jS'  runs this algorithm 
to obtain plain text m  if  is a valid signcryption from L to identity jID'  otherwise 
return . 
For consistency, we require that if  
*
1 n 1 n 1 n 'signcrypt( ,L {ID ,..., ID },S ,...,S ,L {ID' ,..., ID ' }),m then 
*
1 n 1 n ' 1 n 'unsigncrypt( ,L {ID ,..., Id },L {ID' ,..., ID ' },S' ,...,S' )m . 
The proposed scheme: 
Setup: Given k is the security parameter, the PKG chooses the system parameter that 
includes two groups 1 2,  of same prime order q , a bilinear map 1 1 2e :   , a 
generator 1P  , randomly chosen R qs  , R 1R (R P, )   and computes 
pub 1P sP   and pube(P ,R) . The PKG also choose cryptographic hash 
functions
*
0 1H :{0,1}  , 1 2H : {0,1}
l , * *2 qH :{0,1}   where l  is the length of 
plaintext and ciphertext . 
The system public parameters are 
                            1 2 pub 0 1 2params q, , ,e, ,P,P , ,R,H ,H ,Hl    
Key Extract: Given a user identity *ID {0,1}  then PKG compute public key 
ID 0Q H (ID) and private key ID IDS sQ  . 
Signcrypt: Given a message {0,1}
lm , 'n  receiver‟s identity * 1 'L {ID' ,..., ID ' }n  and n 
senders‟ identities 1L {ID ,..., ID },n  each user iID  execute the following steps 
(i) Randomly chooses *i qx   and computes i iX x P , 
xi
iY and i, j i jU x (R Q' )  
for j 1,..., 'n . 
(ii) Sends i i i,1 i,2 i, '(X ,Y ,U ,U ,...,U )n  to other signers through a secure channel. 
(iii)After receiving from the other signers i i i,1 i,2 i, '(X ,Y ,U ,U ,...,U )n , user iID  computes 
(a)
n
i
i 1
X X ,
n
i
i 1
Y Y ,
n
i
i 1
Q Q and 
n n n
1 i,1 2 i,2 n ' i,n '
i 1 i 1 i 1
U U , U U ,..., U U . 
(b) 1c H (Y) m . 
(c) 2 1 2 n 'h H (c,X, U , U ,..., U ) . 
(d) i i iZ hS x Q . 
(iv) Each user sends iZ to other users. Every user computes Z  and outputs ciphertext , 
where 
n
i
i 1
Z Z and
*
1 2 n 'c,X, Z, U , U ,..., U ,L,L .   
Unsigncrypt: To unsigncrypt the ciphertext
*
1 2 n 'c,X, Z, U , U ,..., U ,L,L , the receiver 
with identity jID'   computes  
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(i) 2 1 2 n 'h H (c,X, U , U ,..., U ) , and accepts iff 
(ii) Accept if pube(P,Z) e(X hP ,Q) . 
      It then extract jU from  and computes 
(iii) 1pub j jY' e(P ,U )e(X,S' ) , and recovers 
(iv) 1c H (Y ')m  
8. Security : 
(i) Confidentiality: Without knowing the secrete key of receiver, no one can compute 
n
i
i 1
Y Y
(x ... x )1 n (x ... x )1 n
pube(P ,R) .  It is only the specific receiver who can compute 
the actual value of Y using secrete key as 
  1pub j jY' e(P ,U )e(X,S' ) = 
n
1
pub i, j j
i 1
e(P , U )e(X,S' )        
     
n
1
pub i j j
i 1
e(P , x (R Q' ))e(X,S' )  
              
n n
1
pub i pub i j j
i 1 i 1
e(P , x R)e(P x Q' )e(X,S' )  
             1pub 1 n 1 n j je(P ,(x ... x )R)e(sP,(x ... x )Q' )e(X,S' )  
              (x ... x ) 11 npub 1 n j je(P ,R) e((x ... x )P,sQ' )e(X,S' )  
              (x ... x ) 11 n j je(X,S' )e(X,S' )  
              
(x ... x )1 n     Y . 
(ii) Public Verifiability: Any one who has access to the signcryptext can verify the signature 
on the ciphertext which it contains. First the verifier computes 2 1 2 n 'h H (c,X, U , U ,..., U ) , 
n
i
i 1
Q Q , then  checks 
      
n
i i
i 1
e(P, Z) e(P, (hS x Q))
n n
i i
i 1 i 1
e(P, hS )e(P, x Q)  
                  
n n
i i
i 1 i 1
e(P, hsQ )e(P, x Q)  
                  
n
i 1 n
i 1
e(P,hs Q )e(P,(x ... x )Q)  
                  1 ne(P,hsQ)e((x ... x )P,Q)  
                  e(hsP,Q)e(X,Q)  
                  pube(hP ,Q)e(X,Q)  
                  pube(X hP ,Q) . 
(iii)  Unforgeability: Signcryptext is generated using the secret key iS of each the signers. 
Thus no one, not even the one among signers can generate a valid signcryptext without 
knowing the secret key of all the signers.  
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9. Conclusion: We have proposed an efficient Identity Based Multi-Signcryption Scheme. 
We discuss its confidentiality, unforgeability and public verifiability in heuristic way and 
compare it with two existing Id-based multi-signcryption schemes. We also extend the 
proposed scheme to multi-signcryption scheme for multiple receivers.   
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